Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice by Podgor, Ellen S.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 13
Issue 2 Spring 2004 Article 1
Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
Discretionary Justice
Ellen S. Podgor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Podgor, Ellen S. (2004) "Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy:
Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol13/iss2/1
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES:
BALANCING "DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE"'
Ellen S. Podgor2
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 168
I. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES ........... 170
II. FAILURE TO ADHERE TO DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE GUIDELINES ................................ 175
A. PETITE POLICY ...................................... 177
B. GRAND JURY ADVISEMENT .......................... 181
C. PRESENTING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND
JURY .. .............................................. 184
III. INTERNAL REMEDIES FOR GUIDELINE
VIOLATION S ......................................... 185
IV. COURTS CONSIDER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNAL
GUIDELIN ES ......................................... 189
V. ENHANCING GUIDELINE COMPLIANCE ............ 194
A. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN GUIDELINE COMPLIANCE ...... 195
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct ....................... 196
2. Shifting the Burden ............................. 197
3. Forwarding to the Office of Professional
Responsibility .................................. 198
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ......................... 198
C. EXECUTIVE COMPLIANCE MEASURES ................. 200
CONCLUSION ................................................ 202
1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
2 Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Visiting Professor of
Law, The George Washington University Law School, fall 2003. John S. Stone Visiting En-
dowed Chairholder, University of Alabama School of Law, Fall 2001, Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Georgia School of Law, fall 2000. Visiting Scholar, Yale Law School, fall
1998. The author thanks Professors Leslie Griffin, Peter Henning, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., and
Peter Raven-Hansen. The author also thanks past research assistants Edward Pfsiter and Raina
Schactman, and librarian Beth Adelman and the Georgia State University College of Law for
its financial assistance during the writing of this article. The author thanks the faculty of
Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis for their comments on a draft of this article.
168 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:167
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors are afforded enormous discretion in a multitude of deci-
sions. 3 For example, they decide who will be charged with crimes,4 what
crimes will be charged, 5 what evidence will be submitted to a grand
jury,6 whether discovery materials will be released earlier than mandated
by statute,7 whether an accused will receive benefits for cooperating
with the government, 8 and whether cases will be plea bargained,
dismissed, or tried.9 The law sets the external boundaries for many
of these functions, but prosecutors may move relatively freely
within these boundaries in exercising their executive function.' 0 Seldom
3 There has been an enormous amount of scholarship on issues related to prosecutorial
discretion. See DAVIS, supra note 1; see also Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal
Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246
(1980); Abraham Goldstein, The Victim and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 47 L. & CoNT. PROB. 225 (1984) (discussing discretion as it
relates to victims); Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 2117 (1998); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary Sys-
tem, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 669 (1992); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking
the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
137 (1995); James Vorenberg, The Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521 (1981); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecu-
tors, 88 GEO. L. J. 207 (2000).
4 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding that absent an imper-
missible standard such as race or religion, prosecutors have discretion to decide who will be
charged with a crime). See also Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of
Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U.
PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in charging); Mark Lemle Am-
sterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Selective Prosecution In Federal Courts, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
L.J. 1 (1974) (discussing selective prosecution in federal courts).
5 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that a defendant is not
entitled to a discovery claim for a selective prosecution argument).
6 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (holding that the government is not
required to disclose "substantial exculpatory evidence" to a grand jury).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 151 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
although the government has no obligation to release discovery material early, it has this
option).
8 The government has the exclusive authority to offer a reduction in sentence premised
upon cooperation. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2001). See also Cynthia
Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REv. 105 (1994).
9 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a), at 10 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing the range of discretionary decisions afforded to prosecutors); see also); James Vor-
enberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); Fred C.
Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998).
10 Professor Norman Abrams, in a 1971 article, noted the benefits of this prosecutorial
discretion:
The major advantage of such discretion is that it provides early in the decision-
making process a flexibility and sensitivity not available in a system where
prosecutorial decisions must be made according to predetermined rules. It permits a
prosecutor in dealing with individual cases to consider special facts and circum-
stances not taken into account by the applicable rules.
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do constitutional constraints impede the discretionary power of
prosecutors. "
Internal "guidelines"' 12 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) assist
federal prosecutors in making the decisions that fall within their discre-
tionary realm.' 3 These internal guidelines, usually found in the United
States Attorneys' Manual, provide government prosecutors with gui-
dance in making decisions. 14 Although these guidelines are policy state-
ments and not legislative rules, 15 they offer an element of consistency to
the decision-making process, provide education for newcomers to the de-
partment, and can serve as a restraint on prosecutorial discretion.
1 6
Prosecutors however, do not always adhere to these guidelines.
17
The accused has no judicial recourse when prosecutors fail to abide by
these guidelines, as courts routinely find these guidelines strictly internal
and unenforceable at law. Thus, when it comes to DOJ guidelines, a
failure to follow office procedure is an error that cannot be used by the
accused who might suffer as a result of this violation.'
8
This article focuses on criminal cases involving violations of DOJ
internal guidelines. It uses as examples three guidelines that have been
violated by attorneys in the Justice Department and examines the judicial
response to these transgressions. It contrasts this judicial response to
court treatment of guideline violations by other administrative agen-
cies.' 9 After discussing the guideline violations and court responses to
these transgressions, this article focuses on why compliance with the
guidelines is important and how it can be improved.
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2 (1971).
11 Reaching a constitutional level requires a showing of a due process violation or a
discretionary decision that violated equal protection mandates, such as a charging decision that
used an impermissible criteria such as race or religion. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (1985).
Guidelines adopted by the Department of Justice, however, do need to stay within the limits of
Constitution. See United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating
that the "government cannot adopt a prosecution policy which, if adopted by Congress as a
statute, would be unconstitutional").
12 Guidelines is the accepted term used to describe the policy statements of the Depart-
ment of Justice. They are not rules, carry no legislative authority, and are issued internally by
the Department of Justice. See infra Part I.
13 See infra Part I.
14 Id. (discussing the development of the guidelines and the different forms of guidelines
used by the Department of Justice).
15 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.3 (2002) (discussing
the differences "between rules and policy statements").
16 See generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guide-
lines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (2000) (discussing
how DOJ guidelines can serve as a restraint on federalization).
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra notes 54-108 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 149-169 and accompanying text.
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This article advocates for a heightened review by the judiciary, leg-
islature, and executive when DOJ guidelines are ignored. This oversight,
however, needs to be sensitive to the benefits of continuing the practice
of having the DOJ construct meaningful internal guidelines. The article
examines remedies that achieve a balance between continuing the prac-
tice of having guidelines and yet also having meaningful policies that are
adhered to by department employees.
Left for discussion in the next article are problems associated with
having one individual or group of individuals within the DOJ formulat-
ing policy that will effect non-employees of the DOJ. As stated by Pro-
fessor Richard J. Pierce, Jr. in discussing discretion in administrative
law, "conferring too much discretion on an individual or an institution
creates the potential for harm attributable to abuse of discretion." °2 0 Al-
though the DOJ policy statements can significantly influence the case of
an individual accused of a crime, as seen in the policy directive issued by
Attorney General John Ashcroft calling for prosecutors "to charge and to
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense in all federal prosecu-
tions," 2 1 this article does not focus on the content of the guidelines or the
policy decisions in formulating these statements. Rather, this Article
looks at the guidelines as conceptually beneficial to the Department and
seeks ways to assure compliance with them.
I. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES
DOJ guidelines are written internally within the department. They
are subject to change at the will of the Attorney General, and, for the
most part, they are enforceable only as the department chooses to enforce
them. Unlike the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which are mandatory in
nature and subject to judicial imposition and review, the Justice Depart-
ment's guidelines are internally created and enforced. They are not a
part of the Code of Federal Regulations and they carry no legislative
authority. 22
Most of the internal guidelines of the Department of Justice are
found in the United States Attorneys' Manual.23 The Manual describes
20 See PIERCE, supra note 15, § 17.1, at 1227.
21 Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges,
and Sentencing, Memo of Attorney General John Ashcroft, available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
22 In some instances the Code of Federal Regulations may overlap with the guidelines.
See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2003) ("Policy with regard to issuance of subpoenas to members of the
news media, subpoenas for telephone toll records of members of the news media, and the
interrogation, indictment, or arrest of, members of the news media.").
23 On occasion the Department of Justice will issue policy via a handbook or office
directive. See, e.g, United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing Depart-
ment of Justice Handbook issued after the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984).
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itself as a "looseleaf text" that "contains general policies and some pro-
cedures relevant to the work of the United States Attorneys' offices and
to their relations with the legal divisions, investigative agencies, and
other components within the Department of Justice."
24
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual is not a stagnant document, as sections
within the Manual are continually being revised. These revisions include
"policy" changes that require several layers of departmental review
before being added to the Manual25 and "procedural" changes 26 that are
not subject to a similar scrutiny prior to insertion in the Manual. The
Manual is "prepared under the general supervision of the Attorney Gen-
eral and under the direction of the Deputy Attorney General, by the
United States Attorneys, the Litigating Divisions, the Executive Office
for the United States Attorneys, and the Justice Management Division.
27
Publication of prosecutorial guidelines is relatively new. In a 1971
article, Professor Norman Abrams advocated for a comprehensive
prosecutorial policy. 28 Although he offered eight arguments that might
discourage publishing internal policy, 29 he stressed the need to move in
this direction. He predicted that "making prosecutorial policy public"
would "subject it to scrutiny, evaluation, and criticism by outsiders." 30
His prediction has proved to be accurate. Today federal prosecution
policy is easily accessible in both hard text and online. 3' Also apparent
24 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 1-1.200 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam (last visited Nov. 9, 2003) [herein-
after U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL].
25 Policy changes are designated "bluesheets" and require a procedure for passage:
Policy changes are submitted by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General,
Associate Attorney General, a litigating division or the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA). Policy changes submitted by an Assistant Attorney
General for a litigating division or the Director EOUSA must be reviewed by the
Attorney General's Advisory Committee (AGAC) before being incorporated into the
Manual. If the AGAC objects to the proposed policy change, it will meet with the
litigating division or EOUSA to resolve. Unresolved issues will be resolved by the
Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General. Policy changes issued by the Attor-
ney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Associate Attorney General are effective
upon issuance.
Id. at 1-1.600.
26 "Procedural changes to the Manual do not require review by the Advisory Committee
and can be incorporated directly into the Manual." Id.
27 Id. at 1-1.200.
28 Professor Abrams stated: "[lit is both feasible and desirable to develop comprehen-
sive and detailed policy statements governing the exercise of prosecutorial decision-making
and that significant prosecution resources should be allocated to the task of developing such
policy."
Abrams, supra note 10, at 57.
29 See id. at 28-34.
30 Id. at 27.
31 The Department of Justice Manual was initially published by Prentice Hall in 1987
and remained a Prentice Hall publication until 1999. In the Editor's Introduction to the multi-
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is a growing number of appellate decisions that include as issues claims
by defense counsel that the government has violated one of the Depart-
ment of Justice guidelines. Irrespective of whether publication of the
guidelines is correlated to their increased use by defense counsel, there
are enormous benefits to the adoption and use of the guidelines.
The federal guidelines used by Department of Justice attorneys to-
day are comprehensive and detailed. The guidelines provide guidance in
a wide array of areas such as charging, 32 when it is necessary to seek
approval from superiors, 33 procedures regarding international prosecu-
tions 34 and department policy on sentencing. 35
Some of the DOJ guidelines have been criticized, such as those for
law office searches 36 and for grand jury subpoenas to defense counsel. 37
Some of the guidelines authorize conduct that the general public might
frown upon. For example, the DOJ guidelines define the term "lures" as
"a subterfuge to entice a criminal defendant to leave a foreign country so
that he or she can be arrested in the United States . . . or in a third
volume treatise it stated that this was "not itself an official publication of the Department." See
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL xxiii. In 2000, a Manual was published in text form by
Aspen Publishers. The official Manual "is published by the Executive Office for United States
Attorneys and is distributed to each United States Attorney's Office and Litigating Division of
the Department of Justice." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 1-1.500 (1997). Today, the guidelines
can also be found online in both the Westlaw and Lexis retrieval systems. Additionally, the
Department of Justice website, accessible to the general public, contains the entire Manual.
See http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia .readingroom/usam/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2003).
32 See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-27.230 (2002)) ("Initiating and Declining Charges -
Substantial Federal Interest"); see also Memorandum from Larry D Thompson, Deputy Attor-
ney General, to Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys (January 20,
2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
33 See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.400 (2003) (listing a prior approvals chart). One
also finds requirements of seeking approvals within specific guidelines. For example, prior to
filing a case under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), it is neces-
sary to obtain approval from department supervisors. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-
110.101 (1999).
34 For example, there are specific guidelines regarding extraditions. See, e.g., U.S. AT-
TORNEYS' MANUAL 9-15.620 (providing the guideline for "extradition for a third country");
U.S. ATTORNEYS" MANUAL 0-15.240 (providing a guideline on the "documents required in
support of request for extradition").
35 See Letter of John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Departmental Policies and Procedures
Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals, July 28, 2003, available at
http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:qU5x-41LvUIJ:www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/
2cddO2b41 5 ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/%24FILE/AshcroftCharging%252oMemo.
pdf+July+2 8 ,+2 003+Memorandum+on+%E2%80%9Cdepartment+Policies+and+Procedures+
Concerning+Sentencing+Recommendations+and+Sentencing+Appeals,%E2%80%9Dr=en&
ie=utF-8 (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
36 See Steven J. Enwright, Note, The Department of Justice Guidelines to Law Office
Searches: The Need to Replace the "Trogan Horse" Privilege Team with Neutral Judicial
Review, 43 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 1855 (1997) (advocating that the DOJ law office search guide-
lines are contrary to the attorney-client privilege).
37 See Michael F. Orman, Note, A Critical Appraisal of the Justice Department Guide-
lines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense Attorneys, 1986 DUKE L.J. 145 (1986).
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country for subsequent extradition, expulsion, or deportation to the
United States." The guidelines permit prosecutors to use "lures" and
merely require that the prosecuting attorney "consult with the Office of
International Affairs before undertaking a lure to the United States or a
third country. '38
In many instances, the guidelines offer the accused benefits that ex-
ceed constitutional mandates. For example, although prosecutors have
no constitutional obligation to give grand jury witnesses advice warnings
informing them when they are a "potential defendant in danger of indict-
ment," 39 the guidelines mandate attorneys to provide an "advice of
rights" form to witnesses who are likely to be indicted by the govern-
ment. 40 In this, and other instances, the accused receives clear benefits
by the enactment of these guidelines.
In some cases, the guidelines offer internal constraints to overly
broad statutes. 41 For example, Gerard E. Lynch discusses the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act's42 breadth and its "draconian
penalties," especially in the forfeiture area.43 The DOJ has created ex-
tensive policy to monitor and control how its office files cases. 44 In con-
38 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-15.630 (1997). Actual practice shows that the govern-
ment participates in "luring" activities. See Russian Hacker Sentencing to 3 Years in Prison,
AP, Oct. 5, 2002, at http://www.modbee.com/24hour/technology/story/562860p-4430289c.
html (discussing how the United States set up a bogus company and then invited the defend-
ants to the United States to the United States to demonstrate their hacking skills); see also
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
39 See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 182 (1976) (holding that "[t]he consti-
tutional guarantee is only that the witness be not compelled to give self-incriminating testi-
mony"). It should be noted, however, that in the Washington case, the "respondent was
explicitly advised that he had a right to remain silent and that any statements he did make
could be used to convict him of a crime." Id. at 188.
40 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-11.151 (2002). See infra notes 86-100 and accompany-
ing text.
41 Cf. Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the
Alarm or "Crying Wolf," 50 SYR. L. REV. 1317, 1372 (2000) (discussing how guidelines
serve as reinforcement).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq. The RICO Act is also known as Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970. See generally Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983) (pro-
viding a history and general overview of the RICO statute).
43 See generally Gerald E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being Criminal, Parts I & II, 87
COLUMBIA L. REV. 661 (1987) (noting the attention RICO has received "because of its draco-
nian penalties").
44 The preface to the RICO guidelines reflects the policy rationale of restricting govern-
ment use of this statute:
The decision to institute a federal criminal prosecution involves a balancing process,
in which the interests of society for effective law enforcement are weighed against
the consequences for the accused. Utilization of the RICO statute, more so than
most other federal criminal sanctions, requires particularly careful and reasoned ap-
plication, because, among other things, RICO incorporates certain state crimes. One
purpose of these guidelines is to reemphasize the principle that the primary responsi-
bility for enforcing state law rests with the state concerned.
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trast, no guidelines exist to control filings by private parties using the
civil provisions of RICO. Congress has intervened in the civil context to
place a statutory restriction on how private parties may use the statute.
45
Few restraints, however, have been placed on prosecutors who bring
criminal RICO cases. Former Assistant Attorney General Edward S.G.
Dennis, Jr. noted that "[t]he key to our use of RICO in prosecuting
white-collar crime is to confine the statute's use to those cases where the
unlawful conduct was both continuous and egregious and where there is
the prospect of significant forfeiture of ill-gotten proceeds or of interests
in a tainted enterprise." '46
Guidelines have also been used to stop controversial practices that
individual Assistant United States Attorneys, or the offices they work
Despite the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the stat-
ute ". . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate remedial purpose," it is the policy
of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used. It is the
purpose of these guidelines to make it clear that not every case in which technically
the elements of a RICO violation exist, will result in the approval of a RICO charge.
Further, it is not the policy of the Criminal Division to approve "imaginative" prose-
cutions under RICO which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the
RICO statute. Stated another way, a RICO count which merely duplicates the ele-
ments of proof of a traditional Hobbs Act, Travel Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, gam-
bling or controlled substances cases, will not be added to an indictment unless it
serves some special RICO purpose as enumerated herein.
Further, it should be noted that only in exceptional circumstances will approval be
granted when RICO is sought merely to serve some evidentiary purpose, rather than
to attack the activity which Congress most directly addressed - the infiltration of
organized crime into the nation's economy.
These guidelines provide only internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not
intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are
any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the De-
partment of Justice.
U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110.200 (1988). There are also guidelines restricting the use
of RICO in certain contexts. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110.340 (2000) (providing
that "[n]o indictment shall be brought charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) based upon
a pattern of racketeering activity growing out of a single criminal episode or transaction."). In
hearings regarding asset forfeiture, the United States Attorney's Office has touted its guide-
lines as showing that its forfeiture policy is "administered fairly and effectively, with all ap-
propriate consideration given to the rights of property owners." See Stephan D. Cassella,
Statement Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Concerning H.R. 1835, The Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, (June 11, 1997) (transcript available at 1997 WL 311709
(F.D.C.H.)) (discussing the "detailed policy guidelines governing the use of the administrative,
civil judicial, and criminal forfeiture laws of all agencies of the Department.").
45 Congress added language to the civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), restricting its
use by stating that "no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (2000).
46 Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43
VAND. L. REV. 651, 671 (1990). See also Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Ap-
proval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1035 (1990).
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within, might implement. 47 For example, RICO includes mail fraud as a
predicate act for a charge.48 Tax fraud is not on the list of predicates for
RICO. Since prosecutors could not directly use tax fraud to obtain the
increased RICO penalties, they creatively made the tax fraud charge into
mail fraud 49 by claiming that the mailing of a false tax return constituted
mail fraud. 50 Consequently, mailing of a false tax return became a predi-
cate for RICO and when the conduct formed a pattern of racketeering it
became subject to an increased sentence. This practice was criticized. 51
In 1989, the DOJ added a guideline that stated that "only in exceptional
circumstances" would authorization be granted for a RICO charge when
a mail fraud predicate was being premised upon the mailing of a false tax
return. 52 This guideline, however, has not ended this creative
prosecutorial practice of charging mail fraud for the mailing of a false tax
return.
53
II. FAILURE TO ADHERE TO DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE GUIDELINES
It is impossible to ascertain the full extent of guideline violations
that occur in the DOJ. Although one can monitor the violations reported
as arguments in appellate decisions, as this paper does, there are likely to
be instances of guideline violations that have not been presented for ap-
pellate review. This is particularly true in light of clear precedent that
rejects these arguments as a basis for relief.54 Violations of Department
of Justice guidelines may also have been an issue at preliminary court
hearings that did not result in reported decisions. Similarly, cases that
terminated with the entry of a plea agreement would preclude review of a
47 Guidelines can also be used to stop controversial practices of investigating agencies.
For example, new guidelines were implemented to include DOJ attorneys in determining
whether individuals may be "accepted as informants." See Editorial, Informants Who Corrupt
the Law, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 2001, at A26.
48 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
49 See, e.g., Busher v. United States, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
51 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, TaxFraud-Mail Fraud: Synonymous, Cumulative or
Diverse?, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 903 (1989) (discussing the use of mail fraud when the crime
was actually the filing of a fraudulent tax return).
52 The guideline states in part:
The authorization of the Tax Division is required before charging mail fraud counts
either independently or as predicate acts to a RICO charge: (1) when the only mail-
ing charged is a tax return or other internal revenue form or document; or (2) when
the mailing charged is a mailing used to promote or facilitate a scheme which is
essentially only a tax fraud (e.g., a tax shelter). Such authorization will be granted
only in exceptional circumstances ...
U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 6-4.211(1) (1988) (footnote omitted).
53 See, e.g., Helmsley v. United States, 941 F.2d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991) (charging mail
fraud for the failing of alleged false state tax returns).
54 See infra notes 134-148 and accompanying text.
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guideline violation, since plea agreements routinely include waivers of
appellate rights. Thus, there can be numerous instances when guideline
violations would not surface for public review.
This next section looks at three areas where appellants raise a fed-
eral prosecutor's violation of internal DOJ policy as an issue on appeal. 55
The sampling selected for discussion here reflects areas where federal
prosecutors repeatedly violated the same department guideline. These ar-
eas, however, are by no means exhaustive of all the instances of alleged
DOJ guideline violations.56 There have been numerous DOJ guideline
violations by federal prosecutors, including violations of media guide-
lines,57 subpoena guidelines,5 8 improper charging of cases under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,59 and failure to fol-
low the death penalty protocol of the department. 60 In hearings, Con-
55 This section is limited to reported decisions in which the appellant raises as an appel-
late issue a prosecutor's failure to abide by a department guideline. Unreported cases and
cases in which the issue was not raised by the appellant may provide a powerful source of
possible transgressions, but the numbers and incidents cannot be ascertained to include within
this article. In some cases, legislative hearings provided a source on guideline violations. See,
e.g., Richard A. Jaffe, Allegations of FDA Abuses of Authority, Testimony before the House
Committee on Commerce Oversight and Investigations, July 25, 1995, at 4 (1995 WL 441379
(F.D.C.H.)) (discussing abusive subpoena tactics used that were in violation of Department of
Justice guidelines); Hearing on the Independent Counsel Statute, House Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial & Administrative Law, June 11, 1999, at 14, 15
(1999 WL 385774 (F.D.C.H.)) (Statements of Rep. Nadler) (discussing violation of DOJ
guidelines).
56 There are many alleged guideline violations not covered in this article. See, e.g.,
United States v. Serrano, 680 F. Supp. 58, 65 (D. P.R. 1988) (discussing failure to follow
guidelines related to immunized testimony); United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 832 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (finding that "[i]t is ... solely within the province of the Justice Department to
determine whether an internal policy against forum shopping in obscenity cases should bar
prosecution in a given case"). There are also alleged violations of Department of Justice
guidelines involving the civil matters of the department. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 34 n.17 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that guidelines related to mergers are
not binding on the courts); F.T.C. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (holding that merger guidelines are not binding on a court); see also Louis B. Schwartz,
The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or
Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 575 (1983).
57 See, e.g., Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing violations
of guidelines regarding statements to the media).
58 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena For Attorney, 724 F. Supp. 458, 461 (S.D. Tex.
1989) (discussing an alleged violation of the guidelines related to obtaining prior approval of
the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division prior to subpoenaing an attorney re-
lated to his representation of a client); see United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.
1980) (concluding that the government failed to abide by the rules on grand jury subpoenas).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 861 n.20 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding
that the RICO charging "appear[ed] to run afoul of Justice Department's own guidelines for
charging separate predicate acts").
60 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing the
failure of the DOJ to follow the death penalty protocol in § 9-10.000 et seq.).
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gress has also noted violations of Department of Justice guidelines, such
as the policies and rules for consideration of clemency.6'
Several themes are prominent among guideline violations. In almost
all cases, the defense is unsuccessful in raising as an appellate issue a
violation of DOJ guidelines. 62 Courts find that absent an "independent
constitutional" basis, there is no basis for judicial enforcement of the
guidelines. 63 A different result is seen, however, when the government
admits the violation and seeks to correct its mistake. In these limited
instances, the authority of the government to remedy a DOJ violation is
allowed.64 Finally, courts will not use their supervisory powers to en-
force a DOJ guideline if the sole basis for the argument is that a federal
prosecutor violated internal policy. 65
A. PETITE POLICY
Several appellate decisions report violations of the Petite Policy of
the DOJ. The Petite Policy, deriving its name from Petite v. United
States,66 "precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecu-
61 See Senator Orrin G. Hatch, FALN and Role of Justice Department, Statement before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Oversight, Oct. 20, 1999 (1999 WL 961665
(F.D.C.H.)) (discussing how "policies and rules for the consideration of clemency were appar-
ently ignored").
62 This result is not unique to the three guidelines presented here. One finds this same
result with other guideline violations. For example, after the passage of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, the Department of Justice issued a handbook offering guidance to
federal prosecutors. In United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1990), the defendant
argued for a remand in that prosecutors had not notified him of a possible sentence enhance-
ment as called for in department policy. The court rejected this non-compliance as being a
basis for a court remedy noting that the handbook stated, "[a]s is the situation with regard to
other Departmental policies, compliance is expected in all cases but a failure to comply is not
intended to confer any rights on a defendant or another party in litigation with the United
States." Id. at 264 (citing Handbook, p. iii). The court however, noted extenuating circum-
stances that justified notice not being given in this case.
63 See generally John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investiga-
tions, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 787-88 (1984).
64 See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). In United States v. Fiallo-Jacome,
784 F.2d 1064 (11 th Cir. 1986), the government admitted violating departmental policy, spe-
cifically guideline 1-1 1.320, in having the same judge who heard defendant's immunized testi-
mony, sentence him. The court vacated defendant Brenner's sentence stating that "[a]lthough
these guidelines are not binding authority in this court, we accept the government's confession
of error in this particular case .. " Id. at 1067.
65 Obviously, if the appellant alleges a constitutional violation, there may be a basis for
reversal. Thus, the court would not be using the guideline as the focus of the argument.
66 361 U.S. 529 (1960). In Petite, the Court remanded for dismissal a case in which the
government sought dismissal of an indictment. With the consent of the defendant, tne govern-
ment attempted to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that it is general policy of the Federal Government "that several of-
fenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried together and
should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by consider-
ations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law enforcement."
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tion, following a prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially
the same act(s) or transaction(s). '67 The policy provides three extenuat-
ing circumstances that allow a federal prosecution to go forward despite
a prior state or federal prosecution on substantially the same matter.68
The policy actually predates the Petite decision as it was initiated
by Attorney General William Rogers in a 1959 memo to United States
Attorneys. 69 Responding to two companion cases, Bartkus v.
Id. at 530. The Court remanded noting that it was "empowered" to do so "in the interest of
justice." id.
67 See U.S. ArTrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.031 (2003).
68 The "three substantive prerequisites" are that:
first, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second, the prior prosecu-
tion must have left the interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, applying the
same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the government must believe
that the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible
evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction by an unbi-
ased trier of fact.
Id. Additionally "there is a procedural prerequisite," that being, obtaining the approval of "the
appropriate Assistant Attorney General." It is not mandatory for a prosecutor to pursue an
action if all of these conditions are met. Id.
69 "MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
"In two decisions on March 30, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States reaf-
firmed the existence of a power to prosecute a defendant under both federal and state
law for the same act or acts. That power, which the Court held is inherent in our
federal system, has been used sparingly by the Department of Justice in the past.
The purpose of this memorandum is to insure that in the future we continue that
policy. After a state prosecution there should be no federal trial for the same act or
acts unless the reasons are compelling. "In Abbate v. United States and Bartkus v.
Illinois [359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684] the Supreme Court held that
there is no violation of the double jeopardy prohibition or of the due process clause
of our federal Constitution where there are prosecutions of the defendant, both in the
state and in the federal court, based upon the same act or acts.
"This ruling reaffirmed the holding in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 [43 S.Ct.
141, 67 L.Ed. 314] decided by the Supreme Court in 1922. * * *
"But the mere existence of a power, of course, does not mean that it should necessa-
rily be exercised. * * *
"The Court held then that precedent, experience and reason supported the conclusion
of separate federal and state offenses.
"It is our duty to observe not only the rulings of the Court but the spirit of the rulings
as well. In effect, the Court said that although the rule of the Lanza case is sound
law, enforcement officers should use care in applying it.
"Applied indiscriminately and with bad judgment it, like most rules of law, could
cause considerable hardship. Applied wisely it is a rule that is in the public interest.
Consequently-as the Court clearly indicated-those of us charged with law enforce-
ment responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and with self-restraint in
this area.
"Cooperation between federal and state prosecutive officers is essential if the gears
of the federal and state systems are to mesh properly. We should continue to make
every effort to cooperate with state and local authorities to the end that the trial occur
in the jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the public interest is best
served. If this be determined accurately, and is followed by efficient and intelligent
cooperation of state and federal law enforcement authorities, then consideration of a
second prosecution very seldom should arise.
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Illinois70 and Abbate v. United States,7' the Attorney General recognized
that while prosecutors might not violate prescriptions against double
jeopardy when there is a successive prosecution, the practice was unwise
and should be informally controlled.
The rationale for the Petite policy is "to vindicate substantial federal
interests through appropriate federal prosecutions, to protect persons
charged with criminal conduct from the burdens associated with multiple
prosecutions and punishments for substantially the same act(s) or trans-
action(s), to promote efficient utilization of Department resources, and to
promote coordination and cooperation between federal and state prosecu-
tors."' 72 Despite these worthy goals, federal prosecutors occasionally
proceeded with federal criminal cases based on substantially the same
conduct, after a state prosecution.
Although the government has discretion to dismiss cases when its
Petite policy is violated, defendants are not afforded this same opportu-
nity.73 Cases in which the defense objects premised upon a Petite policy
violation are met with appellate decisions that reject its application to
defendants. 74 Courts find the Petite policy to be "doctrine" of "federal
"In such event I doubt that it is wise or practical to attempt to formulate detailed
rules to deal with the complex situation which might develop, particularly because a
series of related acts are often involved. However, no federal case should be tried
when there has already been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts
without the United States Attorney first submitting a recommendation to the appro-
priate Assistant Attorney General in the Department. No such recommendation
should be approved by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Division
without having it first brought to my attention.
"/s/ William P. Rogers Attorney General"
United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 855-56 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting a Memorandum to
the United States Attorneys by Attorney General William P. Rogers); see also Haley v. United
States, 394 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (W.D. Missouri 1975).
70 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
71 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
72 United States v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507 (E.D. Va. 2000).
73 In Petite the government sought the dismissal of a case because the prosecutor did not
follow the government's internal policy. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); see also
Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29-32 (1977) (holding that it was "an abuse of the
discretion of the District Court to refuse to grant the Government's motion on the ground that
the violation of the Petite policy in this case resulted from prosecutorial misconduct rather than
inadvertence"). There have been repeated court decisions holding that a defendant is not enti-
tled to dismissal for a Petite policy violation. See, e.g., Claiborne, 765 F.2d at 794 (9th Cir.
1985) (finding that even if there were a finding of a Petite policy violation, a dismissal is not
the proper remedy); United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
dismissal is not the proper remedy for a Petite policy violation); United States v. Snell, 592
F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Petite policy does not authorize dismissal of
a case in that it is an internal policy). But see Delay v. United States, 602 F.2d 173 (8th Cir.
1979) (Heaney, J., concurring) (stating that in certain cases the accused should have the right
to enforce the policy).
74 In United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1982), the court stated: "The
Petite policy and cases construing it stand only for the proposition that the government's mo-
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prosecutorial policy, not a matter of constitutional law."'75 Courts have
repeatedly held that failing to adhere to DOJ's internal guidelines does
not warrant court action.76 As the court stated in Hayes v. United
States,77 "we are not prepared to hold that a letter, press release, or simi-
lar statement of the Attorney General, which is not promulgated as a
regulation of the Justice Department, and published in the Federal Regis-
trar, can serve to invalidate an otherwise valid indictment returned by the
Grand Jury."' 78 Although courts have reaffirmed a belief in the beneficial
aspects of this policy and noted that it "ought to be followed," there has
been no corresponding mechanism to assure compliance. 79
One can only find recognition of these arguments in a dissent or
concurring opinion that disputes a court's disregard of a government
transgression of the Petite policy. For example, in United States v.
Thompson8° a three-judge dissent argued that it should not matter
whether the government or defendant asks for a remedy resulting from a
tion to dismiss should be granted when it discovers that it is conducting separate prosecutions
for the same offense. The doctrine does not create a corresponding right in the accused."
75 Id. See also United States v. Rodriguez, 948 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding
"no error in denial of the motion, because the Petite policy is merely an internal rule of the
Justice Department"); United States v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.6 (E.D. Vir. 1991)
(finding the Petite policy a DOJ internal policy); United States v. Robinson, 774 F.2d 261, 275
(8th Cir. 1985) (stating that "even a genuine failure by the Government to follow the Petite
policy does not create a right that a defendant can invoke to bar federal prosecution"); United
States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d. Cir. 1983) (finding that "[iut is not a statute or regulation;
nor is it constitutionally mandated"); United States v, Bouthot, 685 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass.
1988) (stating that "the Petite policy does not create any substantive or due process rights
which a criminal defendant may invoke against the government).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
violation of the Petite policy, an internal rule, is not a basis for dismissal of an action); United
States v. Patterson, 809 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that "the Petite policy is an internal
rule, criminal defendants may not invoke it to bar prosecution by the federal government");
United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the "Department of
Justice may give such weight as it chooses to its internal rules"); United States v. Catino, 735
F.2d 718 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Petite policy does not afford the defendant any
substantive rights); United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1323 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that
"[w]e have repeatedly refused to enforce that policy by dismissing an indictment; the practice
of avoiding dual prosecution sets only an internal guideline for the Justice Department");
United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding "that the Petite policy is
intended to be no more than self-regulation on the part of the Department of Justice"); United
States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the court will not enforce an
"Attorney General's in house rules").
77 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1979).
78 Id. at 818. See also United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978)
("[A] press release expressing a policy statement and not promulgated as a regulation of the
Department of Justice and published in the Federal Register is simply a 'housekeeping provi-
sion of the Department.'"); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 626 (7th Cir. 1969) ("A
letter, press release, or similar statement by the Attorney General, which is not promulgated as
a regulation of the Justice Department and published in the Federal Register, cannot serve to
invalidate an indictment returned by the Grand Jury.").
79 See Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 856.
80 579 F.2d 1184.
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violation of the Petite policy.8 1 This dissent emphasized that "it makes
no difference what they are called nor how they are adopted."
82
Strict adherence to the Petite policy is not always advantageous.
Flexibility in administering the Petite policy allowed for civil rights pros-
ecutions that might not have occurred if the courts required strict compli-
ance with the policy. Attorney General Griffin Bell modified the Petite
policy during his term in office instituting a stricter review when there
was an alleged violation of the policy in a case with civil rights implica-
tions. Under the modified policy, cases that a court might normally dis-
miss because of a state court resolution were subject to a new federal
prosecution. An appellate claim that an indictment should be dismissed
because of its violation of the Petite policy in existence at the time of the
alleged conduct was unsuccessful. The Fifth Circuit responded to this
argument by stating that "[t]hose individuals caught in the net of in-
creased awareness and sensitivity to particular classes of crimes cannot
justify their conduct by noting that at the time of their illegal activity, the
community was more tolerant of similar transgressions. ' 83 The court re-
jected the use of the Petite policy "as a sword to invalidate an otherwise
legitimate indictment."' 84 Today's Petite policy allows the government to
proceed with a case involving "a substantial federal interest" that might
go "unvindicated" if the federal prosecution did not proceed.
85
Examining the Petite policy and prosecutorial violations of this pol-
icy provide several lessons concerning DOJ guidelines. First is that
courts treat this policy as strictly internal to the department. Second is
that courts will not use their supervisory powers to correct violations of
the Petite policy. Third is that the formulation of the Petite policy and its
application requires flexibility to meet changes in DOJ priorities, such as
when the federal system needs to proceed in civil rights cases because
the states are not adequately pursuing these matters.
B. GRAND JURY ADVISEMENT
A second area where there are cases of prosecutors who sometimes
fail to adhere to department policy is in advising grand jury witnesses.
Witnesses subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury are desig-
81 Id. at 1189-92.
82 Id. at 1191. See also Delay, 602 F.2d at 179 (Heaney, J., concurring) (stating that "the
policy should be enforceable by a defendant in an appropriate case").
83 Hayes, 589 F.2d at 818.
84 Id.
85 See U.S. A-rORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.031 (2002) (setting forth the three exemptions that
permit the federal government to proceed after a state action).
2004]
182 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:167
nated by prosecutors as "targets," 86 "subjects," 87 or "witnesses." Al-
though the Constitution does not mandate prosecutors to advise grand
jury witnesses of their target status,88 the DOJ guidelines provide that
"targets" and "subjects" should receive a letter indicating their status as a
"target" or "subject" accompanied by an "advice of rights" form. The
guidelines instruct the Assistant United States Attorney to read the Ad-
vice of Rights form to a target or subject prior to questioning them before
the grand jury. 89
Although the guidelines offer a clear statement of departmental pol-
icy, violations still occur.90 For example, in United States v. Myers9' the
Sixth Circuit recognized a violation of the Department of Justice policy
in failing to provide a target letter to the defendant. The court deter-
mined that the defendant met the prosecution definitions of being both a
target and subject and that an Advice of Rights statement should have
been provided to him.92 Despite this clear violation of DOJ policy, the
86 The Manual defines "target" as:
a person to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking
him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor,
is a putative defendant. An officer or employee of an organization which is a target
is not automatically considered a target even if such officer's or employee's conduct
contributed to the commission of the crime by the target organization. The same
lack of automatic status holds true for organizations which employ, or employed, an
officer or employee who is a target.
U.S. AT-rORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.151 (2002).
87 Subjects are defined as "a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand
jury's investigation." Id.
88 See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 190-91 (1977).
89 The guideline states in part:
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear constitutional imperative, it is the policy of the
Department that an "Advice of Rights" form be appended to all grand jury subpoe-
nas to be served on any "target" or "subject" of an investigation.... In addition,
these "warnings" should be given by the prosecutor on the record before the grand
jury and the witness should be asked to affirm that the witness understands them.
U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.151 (2002).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is
no due process violation in failing to provide the accused an Advice of Rights form prior to his
grand jury appearance); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
failing to warn a witness of their target status in violation of Department of Justice guidelines
did not authorize the use of the court's supervisory powers); United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz,
889 F.2d 301, 307 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the violation of the Department of Justice guide-
lines on grand jury witnesses did not warrant exercise of the court's supervisory powers);
United States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that a failure to give target
warnings does not create a constitutional right); United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754 (3rd
Cir. 1987) (holding that failing to notify a grand jury witness of their status as a target does not
warrant dismissal); Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1321 n.4, 1328 (5th Cir. 1979) (describing how the
defendants' subpoenas did not include target warnings and advice of rights, but that the court
would not enforce internal government guidelines).
91 123 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 1997).
92 The court stated that the Assistant United States Attorney testified "that part of the
reason Myers was placed in front of the grand jury was because he was being investigated."
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Sixth Circuit did not accept the defendant's argument, finding that "a
violation by the government of its internal operating procedures, on its
own, does not create a basis for" defense relief.93 The court emphasized
that it was "troubled by the government's violations of the DOJ
Manual."'94
The poor success rate in presenting these arguments to appellate
tribunals has not always deterred defense counsel from raising this issue
on appeal. Defendants repeatedly make arguments premised upon the
failure of the prosecution to adhere to the DOJ's Advice of Rights Ad-
visement policy. 95 In some cases defendants frame these arguments as
due process claims asking the court to use its supervisory powers to rec-
tify the prosecution violations.96 One instance where this argument
proved successful is found in the case of United States v. Jacobs,97 where
the Second Circuit used its supervisory powers and suppressed grand
jury testimony that had been given without a prior Advice of Rights form
and procedure. 98 Other courts have subsequently criticized the Jacobs
decision, pointing to the fact that newer Supreme Court decisions limit a
court's use of its supervisory powers.
Some courts do express their disappointment with prosecutors who
fail to follow DOJ guidelines. In United States v. Babb,99 the court was
disturbed that the prosecutor who violated the guidelines did not appear
in court to argue the case. The court stated, "[w]e find the prosecutor's
behavior to be more than 'quite troublesome;' we find it to be unprofes-
sional and worthy of severe condemnation."'
' 00
The court also noted that state charges were dismissed so that the federal charges could pro-
ceed. Finally, the court stressed that the questions addressed to Myers in front of the grand
jury related to his conduct. Id. at 355.
93 Id. at 355-56.
94 Id. at 358.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 57 F.3d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a
failure to provide a witness with an "Advice of Rights" form was not a constitutional
violation).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Babb, 807 F.2d 272, 279 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that failing
to adhere to the guidelines on advising a witness of their "target" status does not merit the use
of supervisory powers).
97 547 F.2d 772, 777-78 (2d Cir. 1976).
98 Courts have criticized the Jacobs case as no longer viable in light of two recent deci-
sions, Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (limiting the court's use of
its supervisory powers) and Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (same). These two cases limited the
court's use of its supervisory powers to oversee prosecution activity. See also Myers, 123 F.3d
at 356 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Jacobs decision should be limited by the Bank of Nova
Scotia and Williams decisions). See also United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 310
(1st Cir. 1989) (discussing how the Bank of Nova Scotia decision limits the use of a court's
supervisory powers).
99 807 F.2d 272 (1st Cir. 1986).
100 Id. at 279.
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Examination of prosecution violations of guidelines regarding grand
jury advisement provides three conclusions. First, as with the Petite pol-
icy, courts view policy of grand jury advisement policy as strictly inter-
nal to the department. Second, courts seldom will invoke supervisory
powers to correct these policy violations. Third, unlike the Petite policy
where flexibility may be necessary, there have been no reported cases or
statements that offer justifications for allowing violations of advisement
policy to occur.
C. PRESENTING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY
A third area of cases demonstrating violations of policy can be seen
in decisions concerning the presentation of exculpatory material to a
grand jury. As a result of the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Williams,10 federal prosecutors have enormous discretion in the evi-
dence that they present to a grand jury. In Williams, the Court held that
prosecutors are not required to present "substantial exculpatory evi-
dence" within its possession, to the grand jury. 102 Noting the unique
nature of the grand jury and its role as an arm of the prosecutor to inves-
tigate matters, the Court reasoned that use of its supervisory powers
within this realm was not proper. 10 3
Following the Williams case, the DOJ instituted an internal guide-
line, as it did in formulating the Petite Policy, to soften the effect of the
Court's decision in Abbate. This guideline recognizes the power pro-
vided to prosecutors by the Williams decision but states "that when a
prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of sub-
stantial exculpatory evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject
of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose
such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against
such a person. ' 104 The guideline also emphasizes that non-adherence to
the guideline does not offer a basis for the dismissal of an indictment.
Unlike other guidelines, it suggests that "appellate courts may refer vio-
lations of the policy to the Office of Professional Responsibility for re-
view." 0 5 Thus, the guideline suggests a disciplinary referral to the
specific office within the Department that oversees internal department
discipline.
101 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
102 Id. at 52. (stating that "[i]mposing upon the prosecutor a legal obligation to present
exculpatory evidence in his possession would be incompatible with this system").
103 Id. at 47-48.
104 U.S. ATToRNEYS' MANUAL 9-11.233 (2002).
105 Id.
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Federal prosecutors sometimes violate the guideline instructing
them to present substantial exculpatory material to a grand jury. 0 6 In
United States v. Gross,10 7 the court recognized a clear violation of the
DOJ internal policy, but declined to dismiss the indictment. Interest-
ingly, the court fashioned a remedy that was not provided for in the
guideline. Instead of presenting this violation to the Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility, as suggested in the guideline, the court decided to
send its Order to the supervisors of the United States Attorney's Office
for the Central District of California. The court chose this remedy, stat-
ing that "this is the first time the Court has been presented with a viola-
tion of this provision by" this particular office "and there was some
question as to the exculpatory nature of the evidence."' 0 8
The following conclusions emerge concerning prosecution viola-
tions of the guideline requiring them to present substantial exculpatory
material to the grand jury. First, as with the Petite policy and the grand
jury advisement policy, courts view this policy as strictly internal to the
department. Second, courts will not use supervisory powers to enforce
the guideline since the guideline clearly exceeds constitutional mandates.
Third, courts are often troubled when this guideline is violated and be-
lieve that they have the ability to motivate internal action to correct fu-
ture violations.
III. INTERNAL REMEDIES FOR GUIDELINE VIOLATIONS
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual specifies that it is intended only for
internal use, and that it "is not intended to, does not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at
law by any party in any matter civil or criminal."' 0 9 In Congressional
testimony, prosecutors have argued that they should be exempt from
state ethics rules" ° because the DOJ has guidelines and a disciplinary
process within the department to review allegations of misconduct.'
Congress, however, has appropriately seen otherwise. Although prose-
cutors can be disciplined for violations of state ethics rule violations,
106 See, e.g., United States v. Ransom, 194 F.R.D. 692, 693 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding that
there was no requirement for a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury);
United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding defendant has no right to
"fair" grand jury deliberations).
107 41 F. Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
108 Id. at 1100.
109 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 1-1.100 (1997).
1lO See Citizens Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998).
I'' See, e.g., The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary,
106 Cong. (1999) (statement of Richard L. Delonis, President of the National Association of
Assistant U.S. Attorneys).
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these rules do not cover the vast majority of the areas covered by the
internal guidelines of the Department. 1 2
Although the guidelines are public and accessible, the internal disci-
plinary process of the Department of Justice is not as available. Internal
discipline within the Department of Justice is conducted through its Of-
fice of Professional Responsibility. This office, "which reports directly to
the Attorney General, is responsible for investigating allegations that De-
partment of Justice attorneys have engaged in misconduct in connection
with their duties to investigate, represent the government in litigation, or
provide legal advice."' 13 In past years, the internal enforcement process
of the Office of Professional Responsibility has been criticized for inade-
quately handling the disciplinary process. 114
Although the web page of the Office of Professional Responsibility
states that it submits annual reports to the Attorney General, 15 current
reports are not always available to the public. 16 For example, as of Au-
gust 2003, the latest report of the Office of Professional Responsibility
available on the web is dated fiscal year 2000.1 '7
The 2000 report states that thirty-six inquiries were opened that year
involving alleged misconduct for "failure to comply with DOJ rules and
regulations."" 18 Actual investigations, however, opened by the Office of
Professional Responsibility for alleged "failure to comply with DOJ rules
112 The key ethics rules specifically pertaining to prosecutors, cover areas such as not
bringing charges if probable cause is lacking, making timely disclosure of exculpatory evi-
dence, and making statements to the media. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8 (2002). Federal prosecutors are seldom disciplined in the state ethics system. See Bruce
A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little En-
forcement, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 94 (1995) ("The infrequency with which federal prose-
cutors are sanctioned personally for unethical conduct may be attributed in part to
inadequacies in each of the available disciplinary mechanisms.").
113 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opr/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
114 See Green, supra note 112, at 94 ("While the Justice Department's Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility does have adequate resources to investigate such allegations, it has an
apparent history of inadequate enforcement."); OPR Only Part of the Problem, Experts Say, 4
DOJ Alert, Jan. 3-17, 1994, at 3.
115 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, OPR Annual Reports, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/reports.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
116 The Office of Professional Responsibility will make its finding public in two in-
stances: "when misconduct has been found or when the lawyer under investigation, presuma-
bly after being exonerated, requests that the findings be released." Green, supra note 112, at
86. However, "no public findings will be issued in the overwhelming majority of cases where
prosecutors are exonerated, and in part because in the rare case where findings are released,
the underlying facts developed in the investigation will still be kept secret." Id.
'17 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, supra note 113.
118 See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year
2000 Annual Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/annualreport2000.htm (last visited
August 20, 2003).
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and regulations" numbered nine. ' 9 The report does not explain why
seventy-five percent of alleged guideline violations were not subject to
an inquiry and there is no accounting on the types of violations alleged
involved in the twenty-five percent of the cases that were accepted for
review. Further the Office of Professional Responsibility does not state
how many of the nine cases that were premised upon a "failure to com-
ply with DOJ rules and regulations" had an actual finding of misconduct.
The report merely provides "examples" of matters investigated by the
Office of Professional Responsibility in the fiscal year 2000.120 In this
report, one example specifically references it being a "failure to comply
with DOJ regulations."' 12 1 This example, an allegation of "abuse of sub-
poena power" was found by the Office of Professional Responsibility,
after investigation, to be without merit. 122
Earlier Office of Professional Responsibility reports provide even
less information on Department of Justice guideline violations. The re-
ports for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 do not specifically list a category for
Department of Justice violations.' 23 Thus, there is no way to determine
if the Office of Professional Responsibility investigations during those
two years were focused on violations of department guidelines. The re-
ports do, however, list conduct that might be encompassed within guide-
lines, such as a discovery violation. 124 The 1998 report lists four
allegations of "failure to comply with DOJ rules and regulations"'125 and
the 1999 report lists six. 126 Again there is no accounting provided to
advise readers of the specific guideline involved. One of the examples
provided in the 1998 Annual Report involved a violation of the Petite
policy of the department. The Office of Professional Responsibility de-
termined that a violation had occurred, but did not impose disciplinary
measures since the "subordinate's decision ... was a mistake resulting
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1997
Annual Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/97annual.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
1999); U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1996 Annual
Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/96annual.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 1999).
124 For example, in the 1995-1996 report, alleged misconduct was the subject of com-
plaint in nine cases involving a "failure to disclose exculpatory, impeachment or discovery
material." See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1996
Annual Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/96annual.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
1999).
125 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1998
Annual Report available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/98annual.htm (last visited August 20,
2003).
126 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1999
Annual Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/99AR-Final.htm (last visited August 20,
2003).
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from his inexperience and from the supervisor's concurrence that the pol-
icy did not apply." The Office of Professional Responsibility did not
impose discipline on the supervisor in this case "because he was no
longer employed by the DOJ."'127
The Department of Justice has made a substantial step in recent
years toward compliance with its self-imposed ethical responsibilities. In
1999, for example, the DOJ created a Professional Responsibility Advi-
sory Office "to ensure prompt, consistent advice to Department attorneys
and Assistant United States Attorneys with respect to professional re-
sponsibility and choice-of-law issues."1 28 Oversight of U.S. Attorneys'
Offices throughout the country is also mandated by the Code of Federal
Regulations.1 29 This regulation, however, does not specifically provide
for oversight to assess compliance with the internal Department
guidelines.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also provides oversight
by "investigat[ing] alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, regula-
tions, and ethical standards arising from the conduct of Department em-
ployees in their numerous and diverse activities."' 30 In some instances
the oversight is required by congressional legislation. 31 OIG's critical
report issued on June 25, 2003 concerning September l1th detainees
demonstrates the OIG's independence in reporting to Congress on con-
duct within the DOJ.132
127 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1998
Annual Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/98annual.htm (last visited August 20,
2003). A violation of the Petite policy was also noted in the 1999 Annual Report, in failure of
the DOJ attorney to receive "DOJ approval before prosecuting the defendant for the same acts
that had given rise to a prosecution and acquittal in state court." Although this failure was
noted in the report, it also stated that "the oversight was cured when the DOJ attorneys ob-
tained a waiver nunc pro tunc."See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibil-
ity, Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Report, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/99AR-Final.htm
(last visited August 20, 2003).
128 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Professional Responsibility Advisory Office, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/prao/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
129 28 C.F.R. § 0.22 (2003) (providing for evaluation of U.S. Attorneys' Offices). This
same code provision is cited in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. U.S. AT-rORNEYS' MANUAL 3-
3.000.
130 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, OIG PROFILE, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/semiannual/0503/profile.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
131 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 1001(3) OF PUBLIC LAW 107-56), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/igwhnewl.
htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
132 Glenn A. Fine, "The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens
Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 At-
tacks," Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 25, 2003, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/igwhnewl.htm (last visited Oct.12, 2003).
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Finally, the Executive Office of the United States Attorney serves as
the institutional mechanism for "policy development." It is this office
that "publishes and maintain[s]" the Manual containing the guidelines
and it is this office that supervises educational development within the
department. 33
In considering guideline adherence, it is important to note the dual
structure of the Department of Justice. On one level there is the Wash-
ington, D.C. office, the location of the Office of Professional Responsi-
bility and the Executive Office of the United States Attorney. On a
second tier are the 93 offices located throughout the country, supervised
by individual United States Attorneys. Although monitoring can occur at
both levels, the reporting of guideline violations occurs at the main Jus-
tice Department office.
IV. COURTS CONSIDER VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNAL GUIDELINES
In the 1979 case of United States v. Caceres,134 the Supreme Court
considered what role courts should have in the oversight of administra-
tive guideline violations. Accused of bribery, the respondent moved to
suppress tape recordings and testimony that were obtained without the
proper authorization required by Internal Revenue Service regulations. 135
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected the use of a per se
exclusionary rule when there was a failure to comply with internal guide-
lines of an agency. The Court examined whether there were violations of
equal protection 136 or due process, and found none. 137 Finding no con-
stitutional violation, the Court deemed the evidence admissible. 138
Although the effect of the Court's decision in Caceres is to permit
the admission of evidence despite the violation of internal agency proce-
dures, the Court does not explicitly reject all court monitoring of agency
regulations. The Court distinguishes this case from those "when compli-
ance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or federal
133 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES AT7ORNEY:
MISSION AND FUNCTIONS, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/mission.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2003).
134 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
135 Id .at 743.
136 Id. at 752.
1 37 Id. at 752-73 ("Respondent cannot reasonably contend that he relied on the regulation,
or that its breach had any effect on his conduct.").
138 Id. at 757.
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law." ' 39 Caceres differs from instances when the government is required
to adopt a regulatory structure.140
Caceres provides a clear rationale for not giving agency rules a
force of law in its statement, "[i]n the long run, it is far better to have
rules like those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional
erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record, than either
to have no rules except those mandated by statute, or to have them
framed in a mere precatory form."' 14 The Court's fear of "fewer and less
protective regulations"' 142 serves as the guiding force behind its position
of allowing the agency transgression.
A forceful dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan presents a dif-
ferent picture. Premising their position upon a due process violation,
these two justices present an exhaustive list of cases that support their
view. 143 They argue that the majority erred in "mak[ing] subjective reli-
ance controlling in due process analysis."'"1 They state that using "sub-
jective reliance ... deflects inquiry from the relevant constitutional issue,
the legitimacy of government conduct."1 45
Presenting a position contrary to the majority, the dissenters fear
that "the majority's analysis invites the very kind of capricious and un-
fettered decisionmaking that the Due Process Clause in general and these
regulations in particular were designed to prevent."' 14 6 They state that
"[d]enying an agency the fruits of noncompliance gives credibility to the
due process and privacy interests implicated by its conduct."'' 47 Justices
Brennan and Marshall conclude by stating that the Court's holding "nec-
essarily confers upon the Judiciary a 'taint of partnership in official
lawlessness.' "148
The majority opinion in Caceres captures a view that was expressed
in many of the lower court cases that preceded the decision. Caceres
139 Id. at 749. See also United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that the Court in Caceres did not foreclose court enforcement of guidelines "when 'compli-
ance with the [provision] is mandated by the Constitution or federal law"'); United States v.
Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing Caceres when FBI action vio-
lated federal law).
140 Id. at 749-52.
141 Id. at 756.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 757-61.
144 Id. at 762.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 764.
147 Id. at 769-70. The dissenters criticize the majority for not "acknowledg[ing] counter-
vailing considerations." They state, "[q]uite apart from specific deterrence, there are signifi-
cant values served by a rule that excludes evidence secured by lawless enforcement of the
law." Id. at 769.
148 Id. at 770 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan J.,
dissenting)).
2004] BALANCING "DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE"
also served as a source of precedent for decisions rendered since the
1979 holding. As previously demonstrated, most decisions maintain that
internal policies of the Department of Justice are unenforceable at law.
Many of these cases cite the Caceres decision as binding authority.
In reviewing Department of Justice guideline violations, courts sel-
dom reference the case of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugh-
nessy. 14 9 In Accardi, an immigration case, the "Court vacated a
deportation order of the Board of Immigration Appeals because the pro-
cedure leading to the order did not conform to the relevant regula-
tions." 150 In this case, and others that have followed, 15 1 the Court
considered the question of "whether the alleged conduct of the Attorney
General deprived petitioner of any of the rights guaranteed him by the
statute or by the regulations issued pursuant thereto."' 52 The Court in
Accardi found that an agency's failure to follow its internal rules was
grounds for reversal.
Courts hold that violations of Department of Justice internal guide-
lines differ from the cases that have progressed from the Accardi deci-
sion. 153 DOJ guideline violations are not codified and they involve
internal policy that guides prosecutorial discretion. 154 The DOJ guide-
lines are designated as mere "housekeeping" rules with no substantive
149 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
150 Montilla v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991).
151 See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1963) (overturning contempt
conviction when agency rights violated).
152 Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. at 265.
153 The cases are distinguished by Professor Peter Raven-Hansen who advocates the use
of "equitable balancing" of private and public interests to determine the appropriateness of
government estoppel for an agency rule violation. See Peter Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estop-
pel: When Agencies Break Their Own 'Laws', 64 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1985). Using his analysis,
here, would mean that DOJ policy violations would seldom be a basis for regulatory estoppel.
Since there is no legislative interest in DOJ rules, the public interest is questionable. Likewise,
it would be difficult to demonstrate a detrimental reliance on the guideline, so the private
interest would not be a basis for court intervention. Professor Raven-Hansen states:
a court weighing the private interest should consider: (1) whether the law that has
been violated is mandatory or directory, which determines whether it creates duties
that will support any reliance interest at all; and (2) whether the law is material to the
public, creating a presumption of reliance ("objective reliance"), or whether it is
immaterial, requiring an individualized showing of detrimental reliance ("subjective
reliance").
Id. at 70.
154 See United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
Armstong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) and holding that "prosecutorial discretion has been
treated differently than other types of agency discretion"). The Department of Justice viola-
tions are individual acts and they do not represent a deliberate refusal to accept a guideline.
This is not a situation of an agency rejecting judicial authority. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Non-
acquiescence, Crowell v. Bensen & Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1903
(1989) (discussing nonacquiescence and its "relationship between administrative, adjudication,
and judicial review").
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basis that entails review. 155 A lone district court that attempted to use
the Accardi decision to order a new sentencing phase for DOJ's violation
of its death penalty protocol was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. The
Eighth Circuit held that the Department of Justice Manual specifically
provides that it "does not create substantive or procedural rights enforce-
able by others."' 156
The failure to follow internal guidelines is not a problem exclusive
to the Department of Justice. 157 One finds similar misconduct in other
agencies. There are numerous cases that report violations of the Internal
Revenue Service guidelines. 158 Courts often use the Caceres case as au-
thority for finding that violations of internal guidelines do not present a
constitutional violation and do not provide an individual with a remedy
from the agency that failed to adhere to its internal guidelines. 159 Courts
distinguish, however, where a government agency has officially promul-
gated its regulations. 160 This is in keeping with classic administrative
law principles that provide different treatment for rules and policy
statements.
As one might suspect, failure to follow guidelines of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is a common basis for argument in appel-
155 In Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954) the Court examined the failure to
follow a letter issued by the Department of Justice. The Court stated:
To make the system uniform, Circular Letter No. 2431 was sent to all District Attor-
neys. It was never promulgated as a regulation of the Department of Justice and
published in the Federal Registrar. It was simply a housekeeping provision of the
Department and was not intended to curtail or limit the well-recognized power of the
grand jury to consider and investigate any alleged crime within its jurisdiction.
Id. at 173.
156 See United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 484, 493 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S. ATrORNEYS'
MANUAL § 1-1.100).
157 See, e.g., Jacobo v. United States, 853 F.2d 640, 641 (9th Cir. 1988) (failing to follow
a naval manual did not bind the Navy).
158 See, e.g., United States v. Tenzer, 127 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
neither the defendant "nor the public may reasonably rely on the IRS's non-solicitation pol-
icy"); United States v. Michaud, 860 F.2d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that it is improper
to exclude evidence when there is a breach of an IRS regulation); United States v. Groder, 816
F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing that bad faith requires more than just showing an
agency violation); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1199 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that violations of internal IRS rules do not grant defendant any rights); United States v. Irvine,
699 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing how evidence gathered in violation of an IRS
regulation on agency "warning" requirements does not need to be suppressed); United States v.
Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 104 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that it is improper to exclude evidence
although there is a breach of an IRS regulation).
159 See Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of Judge Harold
Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894 (1980).
160 See Shain v. United States, 978 F.2d 850, 853-54 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that DOJ
regulation was "promulgated without notice" and was merely an internal government
guideline).
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late courts. 16 1 For example, in United States v. Andreas,162 a case ema-
nating from an alleged Sherman Act violation occurring at Archer
Daniels Midland Co. (ADM), the Seventh Circuit examined the failure of
FBI agents to adhere to internal policies in their supervision of tape re-
cordings. 163 The court summarily dismissed the complaint citing the Ca-
ceres holding.
One finds similar results in civil actions brought against the FBI for
failure to abide by department policy. In Kugel v. United States,164 the
District of Columbia Circuit rejected the use of internal Department of
Justice guidelines as a basis for finding a duty in a negligence action.
Despite the fact that these guidelines "mandat[e] that agents exercise
minimal intrusiveness during an investigation to protect an investigative
target from prosecution for improper reasons, from adverse conse-
quences to privacy interests and from avoidable damage to reputation," a
failure to abide by these guidelines does not "create a duty in favor of the
general public."' 65
This position is in keeping with cases involving alleged violations
of internal regulations that occur within other federal agencies. For ex-
ample, in Schweiker v. Hansen, the court determined that a failure to
follow a claims manual of the Social Security Administration (SSA) did
not create a basis for relief. The Court, in a per curiam decision, stated
that the "Claims Manual [was] not a regulation," had "no legal force, and
[did] not bind the SSA."' 166 The Court noted the ramifications of making
a breach of a policy in a "13-volume handbook for internal use by
thousands of SSA employees" a basis for legal action. 67
161 See, e.g., United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that inter-
nal FBI guidelines could not be a basis for providing authority to "FBI agents to promise use
immunity to informants").
162 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000).
163 The court stated:
Many conversations between Whiteacre and one or more conspirators that should
have been recorded were not, and the FBI frequently did not file the necessary re-
ports or provide explanations for these missed conversations. Many of the tapes
Whiteacre made were not collected as promptly as they should have been, and the
catalogue of tapes given to and collected from Whitacre was not meticulously main-
tained. The FBI did not seem to follow its own internal guidelines on supervising
taping activities, but this does not provide a basis for constitutional challenge.
Id. at 661.
164 947 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
165 Id. at 1507.
166 Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
167 Id. at 1471. This case involved a field representative of the Social Security Adminis-
tration who incorrectly orally informed a potential recipient of Social Security benefits that she
was not eligible. The individual, relying on this information failed to file for the benefits, and
was therefore not entitled to sums retroactive to the eligible time. The Court cited to Caceres
in a footnote expressing the position that "a per se rule 'would take away from the Executive
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In evaluating an alleged violation of the Department of Justice, a
court distinguished these internal guidelines from other departmental pol-
icy that is codified finding that because it was "not promulgated as a
regulation" it did not carry any force of law. 168 Absent them being pub-
lished in the Federal Registrar, courts see these internal guidelines as
nothing more than "housekeeping provision [s]."'169
V. ENHANCING GUIDELINE COMPLIANCE
If the guidelines were rules codified into statute or made into a for-
mal regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations, there would be a clear
basis for enforcement. Although codification would offer better compli-
ance, there is a strong policy reason for keeping these policy directives as
internal guidelines and not elevating them to regulatory or constitutional
mandates. In United States v. Ng,170 a case in which the defendant con-
tended that the government had violated the Petite policy, the court
stated that"[t]o hold the policy legally enforceable would be to invite the
Attorney General to scrap it, which would hardly be in the public
interest." 171
On the one hand, guidelines serve important interests of educating
new personnel in the office, providing consistency within offices, and
also providing a structure for important internal policy decisions. Con-
sidering the enormous power wielded by prosecutors, 172 internal gui-
dance can be crucial in ensuring that individual decisions are restricted to
the norms of the Department. 173
Department the primary responsibility for fashioning the appropriate remedy for the violation
of its regulations.'" Id. at 1492 n.5.
168 Hayes, 589 F.2d at 818 (discussing an alleged violation of the Department of Justice's
Petite Policy).
169 See Haley v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (discussing how
noncompliance with the Petite policy does not warrant dismissal); see also United States v.
Hutul, 416 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding the guidelines to be "'housekeeping provision[s]'
of the Justice Department").
170 699 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1983). In the Ng case, the court noted that there was evidence
that the Justice Department had abided by the policy in that they determined that there was
justification to depart from the general rule stated in the policy. Id. at 71.
171 Id. at 71.
172 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
173 In hearings on the Independent Counsel Act, questions were raised concerning the
practices of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. Some of the questions concerned his alleged
failure to follow department policy. Senator Levin, in questioning Independent Counsel Starr,
stated:
Looking at the record of your office, Mr. Starr, in my judgment, despite our best
efforts to establish reasonable limits on the power of independent counsels, you and
your office have managed to exceed those limits. In the ABC News case, you stated
to the court that the relevant Justice Department regulations did quote "not govern an
independent counsel" close quote. And that's the way your office seems to have
operated generally. In my judgment, you've gone beyond what an average prosecu-
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Yet, if the guidelines are nothing more than sheets of paper and
have no acceptance and adherence within the organization, then they
serve no purpose. Thus, it is necessary to find the appropriate balance
between achieving better compliance with the guidelines without derail-
ing the benefits accruing from the existence of having these guidelines.
This next section offers what might be considered "soft" remedies
that can be implemented to enhance guideline compliance. They are soft
in the sense that they do not suggest that enforcement be administered
through strict judicial oversight and correction which may include the
dismissal of criminal cases. Rather, the remedies offered here suggest
steps that might result in improved enforcement without affecting the
beneficial qualities that accrue from having a guideline system.
By offering suggestions for improved compliance with guidelines,
this article does not advocate curtailing prosecutorial discretion. There is
a clear value in having the executive produce and maintain these guide-
lines. There is also a clear value in having "individualized justice."'1 74
But having flexibility that fails to consider the guidelines because of a
lack of knowledge, inadvertence, or a particular attorney's desire to
"win" is not the product of measured discretion and "individualized jus-
tice," but rather the product of individualized action. As such, remedies
to correct these guideline failures are warranted.
A. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN GUIDELINE COMPLIANCE
Precedent clearly holds that use of a court's supervisory powers will
not be premised solely on a violation of DOJ policy. 175 Despite the fact
that a court may be troubled by the violation,1 76 there is seldom judicial
tor would do in the investigation of a private citizen and you have failed to comply
with Justice Department policies as intended under the Independent Counsel law.
The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate, 106 Cong. (1999 WL 221633 (F.D.C.H.)).
174 DAvis, supra note 1, at 19.
175 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that there is
no basis for using supervisory powers for a guideline violation); Application of Shetty, 566
F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that if DOJ policy was "more than in-house" rules and was
published in the Code of Federal Regulations, then the courts might be more better able to
regulate the rules).
176 In United States v. Serrano, 680 F. Supp. 58 (D. P.R. 1988), the court disapproved of
the government's failure to abide by a DOJ guideline. The court stated:
The guidelines provided by the Department of Justice embody the best practice to
properly handle situations involving the prosecution of a defendant who has testified
under a grant of immunity. The ignorance of these guidelines by the United States
Attorney and his assistants, as well as by the F.B.I., is deplorable. Nevertheless, the
failure to follow these guidelines does not mandate dismissal where, as here, defen-
dant's privilege against self-incrimination was not violated.
Id. at 65.
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action taken to address the violation. 177 In some cases, the court will
find it unnecessary to invoke its supervisory powers because the viola-
tion did not affect the conviction, and as such, was harmless error.178
Courts routinely dismiss the violation of a DOJ guideline as an in-
ternal "housekeeping" matter. Suggested here are alternative considera-
tions that may improve compliance. First, it is suggested that there
should be closer review by courts when there is guideline noncompli-
ance. This can be accomplished by allowing defendants to use DOJ vio-
lations as evidence to support allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 179
Second, it is recommended that prosecutors should bear the burden of
showing that they did not engage in misconduct, when there has been a
violation of a department guideline.' 80 Finally, courts should consider
reporting violations through the existing internal process, the Office of
Professional Responsibility, to enhance overall compliance.
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Failure to "follow its normal prosecutorial procedures mandates
stricter judicial scrutiny of the prosecution." 8" Closer scrutiny could en-
hance compliance with the guidelines. In structuring judicial scrutiny,
however, it is necessary to maintain the important values of continuing a
guideline system. As opposed to having guideline violations result in
dismissal or reversal, it is suggested here that courts should consider
prosecutorial misconduct as evidence relating to the overall propriety of
governmental conduct.
Presently, courts summarily deny review of guideline violations
claiming a lack of authority because the guidelines are unenforceable
under law. Because the guidelines are not rules or law, courts do not
have the ability to enforce them. A middle ground exists, however, for
hearing this evidence while not raising it to the level of mandatory
"rules." Courts could view guideline violations as one piece of evidence
in determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred.
Prosecutorial misconduct is often judged from an examination of
the entire record of prosecutorial conduct. The cumulative effect of the
improprieties may mandate a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. This
177 See United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the court was
"troubled" by the violation but declining to implement its supervisory power).
178 See United States v. Babb, 807 F.2d 272 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding it unnecessary to use
supervisory powers where the conviction was not a "product" of "prosecutorial misconduct").
179 See infra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
180 See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
181 United States v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp. 1286, 1293 (D. Colorado 1981) (using a
stricter review to determine whether there was a selective prosecution).
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decision may not be the result of a single incident, but may be the result
of repeated instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 182
One can analogize the use of guidelines in this context as similar to
court use of state professional responsibility rules. Like the DOJ guide-
lines, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were not designed
to be a basis for malpractice or other civil or criminal action against
lawyers. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do "not [them-
selves] give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer."183 Some courts,
however, permit them to be used as evidence in a trial to demonstrate the
community standard for lawyering.1 84
Presently, courts summarily discard guideline DOJ violations as un-
enforceable at law. They cite the Caceres case as authority and then end
the discussion. 185 They seldom consider the violation of the guidelines as
an aspect of the total picture representing the prosecutor's conduct during
trial. Under the approach presented here, the court would examine the
violation as one piece of evidence in support of a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. The violation of a guideline would not constitute a per se
violation, but, along with other evidence of prosecutorial misconduct,
could demonstrate that a prosecutor has violated the community standard
expected of prosecutors.
2. Shifting the Burden
Some defendants have attempted to use violations of DOJ policy as
the basis for claiming prosecutorial misconduct. The level of evidence
needed to support this position is particularly problematic, as courts have
required that the "prosecutorial conduct" be "so fundamentally unfair as
to deny a defendant's constitutional rights."1 86 Shifting the burden of
proof to the government when a DOJ guideline violation occurs may be
182 See, e.g., United States v. Conrad, 320 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (one of three
factors used to constitute prosecutorial misconduct is the "cumulative effect of such
misconduct").
183 The Scope to the Rules state in part:
Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer
nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been
breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other
nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation.
The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope (2002).
184 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537-41 (7th Cir. 1985) (using
judicial ethical opinions in considering recusal of a judge); Cambron v. Canal Insurance Co.,
269 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1980) (finding it proper for a jury to consider standards for attorneys); see
also Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Misconduct: Ethical Rule Usage Leads to Regulation of the
Legal Profession, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1323, 1332-35 (1988).
185 See supra notes 73-106 and accompanying text.
186 United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1328 (5th Cir. 1979).
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more equitable to the defendant and yet not burden the prosecution when
its actions were justified or harmless. 187 This remedy, however, needs to
be sensitive to cases involving national security or undercover opera-
tions, where the disclosure of information might have a harmful effect.188
Thus, closer scrutiny by allowing courts to consider guideline viola-
tions as evidence of government misconduct, coupled with shifting the
burden onto the prosecution to demonstrate that it did not engage in mis-
conduct, may enhance the value accorded to the guidelines. These pro-
posals should not be overly burdensome to the government because they
do not transform the guidelines into law and offer the government relief
when misconduct is based on harmless inadvertence.
3. Forwarding to the Office of Professional Responsibility
Courts should also consider following the advice provided within
some of the guidelines that suggests reporting violations to the Office of
Professional Responsibility. 89 When a court merely finds the guideline
unenforceable, it fails to assist the government in achieving compliance.
Without the knowledge of guideline violations, the government cannot
implement corrections. Reporting violations to the agency, however,
should not be seen as prejudging the conduct as a DOJ policy violation.
Rather, the reporting process should be viewed as indicating that internal
review might be warranted.
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Congressional oversight can also assist in bringing to light guideline
violations and can serve as an impetus for better compliance with these
internal rules. This can be accomplished through direct congressional
review or alternatively through review of guideline compliance by the
Office of the Inspector General.
An example of direct review is seen in the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary's 1999 examination of guideline violations in the clemency
process. Senator Orrin G. Hatch stated that the Justice Department had
"ignored its own rules for handling clemency matters." Specific failure to
adhere to DOJ guidelines included the Department's consideration of the
187 United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2001).
188 See United States v. Marbelt, 129 F. Supp.2d 49 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding that the
defense was not entitled in discovery to internal guidelines of the United States Customs Ser-
vice that relate to undercover operations).
189 Some courts have threatened to report violations. See, e.g., Gillespie, 974 F.2d at 802
(7th Cir. 1992) (stating, "[w]e will, in appropriate circumstances, consider referring internal
policy violations to the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility"); Pacheco-Ortiz,
889 F.2d at 311 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that it would consider referring future violations to the
Office of Professional Responsibility).
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"'possibility' of clemency for the FALN 90 prisoners even though no
personal petitions for clemency had been filed." 19 1
An example of indirect review is seen in the Office of the Inspector
General's (OIG) review of conduct regarding detainees in the aftermath
of September 11 th. In the detailed report, A Review of the Treatment of
Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Inspection
of the September 11 Attacks, 192 the Inspector General for the Department
of Justice dissected the conduct of immigration, FBI, and prosecutors
toward detainees in the aftermath of September 11 th.
Having closer congressional oversight may enhance the level of
compliance with the guidelines. Because legislative review will likely be
limited to those instances of repeated violations or high profile mat-
ters, 193 the burden on the DOJ and Congress should be minimal. Ulti-
mately, Congress could enact legislation removing agency discretion
over the internal process when repeated violations occur. Thus, over-
sight may alert Congress of the need to elevate something from a "house-
keeping" status to formal legislation that would be enforceable by the
courts.
Congressional oversight would assure that policies adopted by the
DOJ are not used merely as a showcase to avoid restrictive legislation. A
Report issued on the "DOJ's Implementation of False Claims Act Gui-
dance in National Initiatives Varies," found that what the Department
was saying and what was actually happening with respect to guidelines
pertaining to the False Claims Act in the Medicare Fraud and Abuse area
did not necessarily coincide. Compliance was found to be "superficial"
despite claims that "compliance with its False Claims Act guidance" was
"an ongoing priority."' 19 4
The Department of Justice invokes DOJ policy to demonstrate to
Congress that there are mechanisms in place to prevent misuse of its
190 Acronym for Armed Forces of National Liberation.
191 Examining Certain Implications of the President's Grant of Clemency for Members of
the Armed Forces on National Liberation (The FALN): Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 106 Cong. 94 (1999) (Testimony of Sen. Orrin Hatch). See also U.S. ATrOR-
NEYS' MANUAL § 1-2.111 (1997).
192 Oversight by the Inspector General's Office recently revealed problems regarding the
implementation of the USA Patriot Act. See STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER I I DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (April 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-06-
index.htm (June 2003) (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
193 Id.
194 STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRES-
SIONAL REQUESTERS, MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: DOJ's IMPLEMENTATION OF FALSE
CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE IN NATIONAL INITIATIVES VARIES, GAO/HEHS-99-170 (August
1999), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?Ipaddress=162.140.64.
21 &filename=he99170.pdf&directory=/Diskb/wais/data/gao.
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discretionary powers. For example, at the 2000 Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings on electronic surveillance, a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General stated that "the Department of Justice imposes its own guide-
lines on top of the privacy protections provided by the Constitution, stat-
utes and the courts." 195 Specifically with respect to the Carnivore
computer program, he noted that "before Carnivore may be used to inter-
cept the context of communications, the requesting investigative agency
must obtain approval from the DOJ asking a court for a Title III or-
der."'196 If prosecutors are permitted to assert DOJ policy as a basis for
allowing their continued discretion in implementing legislation to go un-
checked, then oversight is necessary when repeated instances of non-
compliance with these internal guidelines occur. 197
C. EXECUTIVE COMPLIANCE MEASURES
Enhanced internal mechanisms could assist in providing better com-
pliance with guidelines. For instance, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations offers a detailed structure on how to construct and
maintain a compliance program in the organizational setting. These sen-
tencing guidelines serve to reduce a corporation's culpability with re-
spect to criminal punishment. Although the government could not be
held criminally liable for failure to comply with this internal structure,
instituting a forceful compliance program could assist the government in
achieving positive results.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations provide bene-
fits to organizations for maintaining an "effective program."'198 Aimed at
"prevent[ing] and detect[ing] violations of law" it requires a program that
is "reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally
will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct."' 199 The
essence of achieving an effective program is "due diligence. 2 °°
Seven attributes are listed as the minimal standards for achieving
compliance. 20' Under these guidelines an entity must "tak[e] steps to
communicate effectively its standards and procedures to all employees
195 The Carnivore Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106 Cong., Sept. 9, 2000 (testimony of
Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice) (2000 WL 1268433 (F.D.C.H.)).
196 Id.
197 The discipline offered under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) might serve as a
model for imposing statutory discipline when the internal mechanisms are ineffective. See 5
U.S.C. § 552; see also Paul M. Winters, Note, Revitalizing the Sanctions Provision of the
Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, 84 GEO. L.J. 617 (1996).
198 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k) (2001).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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and other agents, e.g., by requiring participation in training programs or
by disseminating publications that explain in a practical manner what is
required. '202 There would be no need to establish "compliance standards
and procedures to be followed by employees and agents" 20 3 because the
guidelines exist and the compliance program is intended to achieve full
compliance with these standards. "Specific individuals within high-level
personnel of the organization must have been assigned overall responsi-
bility to oversee compliance with such standards and procedures.
204
These duties should be delegated only to responsible individuals.2 0 5 Or-
ganizations need to use appropriate monitoring to detect violations, and
when violations are discovered, there needs to be appropriate
discipline. 20 6
An "effective program" would also require the government agencies
to "take[ ] all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense
and to prevent further similar offenses-including any necessary modifi-
cations to [their] program to prevent and detect violations of law." 20
7
Implementing a program designed to accomplish this goal, as well as the
other seven minimal standards, does require some flexibility depending
upon the "size of the organization," "likelihood that certain offenses may
occur because of the nature of its business," and "prior history of the
organization. '208 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
provide guidance on adjusting the minimum standards to meet the con-
straints of the specific organization.2 °9
Many of the standards for compliance have already been instituted
by the federal government. For example, there is an Office of Profes-
sional Responsibility and there is a Professional Responsibility Advisory
Office, all located within the DOJ. There is also the Executive Office of
the United States Attorney. There are, however, two levels of compliance
needed. On one level there is the main office of the Department of Jus-
tice and on another level there are United States Attorneys' offices
throughout the United States. Compliance needs to be considered at both
of these levels. Due diligence in reporting violations, correcting viola-
tions and teaching the guidelines must happen within each of the individ-
ual United States Attorneys' Offices.
202 Id. at 3(k)(4). Existing professional programs within the Department may already
offer sufficient compliance with this aspect of the program.
203 Id. at 3(k)(1).
204 Id. at 3(k)(2).
205 Id. at 3(k)(3).
206 Id. at 3(k)(5)(6).
207 Id. at 3(k)(7).
208 Id.
209 Id.
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A policy should be put in place that would hold key executives re-
sponsible when they fail to properly monitor the program. United States
Attorneys located throughout the country need to be cognizant of the
importance of adhering to DOJ guidelines.
If the government can proceed criminally against the CEO of a ma-
jor company, as it did in United States v. Park,210 for failing to correct
sanitation conditions at a plant in Baltimore when the CEO was located
in Philadelphia and oversaw "36,000 employees, 874 retail outlets, 12
general warehouses, and four special warehouses," 21 1 then surely it
should be able to properly monitor guideline violations occurring in its
own offices. As previously noted, the key to compliance is "due
diligence." 21 2
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Jacobs, the court noted that "[w]e have com-
mented in camera from time to time on the failure of certain special
attorneys to avail themselves of the central repository of legal knowledge
and judgment that exists in the regular United States Attorneys' Of-
fice."'2 13 In Jacobs, the court chose to use its supervisory powers to dis-
miss the indictment. But most courts do not, and should not, use such a
severe remedy to correct internal government policy violations. If
prosecutorial guidelines become legal mandates, there is justified con-
cern that it will have a diminishing return in that fewer guidelines will be
enacted. This is especially true when the guidelines offer little benefit to
the Department but are tremendously important to the accused, such as is
the case with Grand Jury Advisement of Rights policy.2 1 4
Yet, prosecutorial practice and procedure must be followed more
rigorously and consistently. Repeated violations of the same guideline
should not be the norm. If transgressions are justified, then federal pros-
ecutors need to consider modifications to the guidelines to include possi-
ble unusual circumstances that continually arise. On the other hand, if
guidelines represent an important value that prosecutors do not adhere to
in practice, action needs to be taken to rectify the situation.
Obviously internal enforcement will best serve the important pur-
poses of the guidelines. But if the internal process cannot achieve com-
pliance, then courts and the legislature need to consider ameliorative
action. It is important, however, in taking action to balance the values
inherent in maintaining a guideline structure.
210 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
211 Id. at 660.
212 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k) (2001).
213 547 F.2d 772, 778 (2d Cir. 1976).
214 See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
